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Abstract
This paper explores the changing fortunes of the public realm during the last two decades.
It poses the problem of how we think about globalisation and neo-liberalism as forces driving
these changes. It then examines how different aspects of the public realm – understood as
public interest, as public services and as a collective identity – have been subjected to processes
of dissolution. Different processes have combined in this dissolution – in particular, attempts
to privatise and marketise public services have been interleaved with attempts to de-politicise
the public realm. Tracing these processes reveals that they have not been wholly successful –
encountering resistances, refusals and negotiations that mean the outcomes (so far) do not
match the world imagined in neo-liberal fantasies.
For many, the development of a robust and vigorous public realm was one of
the defining features of Western capitalist democracies: a core element of ‘welfare
capitalism’ in its many varieties (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Huber and Stephens,
2001). At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the public realm looks rather
less robust. Here I examine the dissolution of the public realm – and how to think
about the forces seeking to dissolve it. This focus on the public realm is rather
wider than the question of ‘welfare states’, although they overlap in important
ways. I will be using the term ‘public’ to refer to a number of intersecting social
phenomena: the idea of a ‘public interest’ which may require forms of collectivised
expression; the institutionalisation of ‘public services’ (as a means of meeting the
public’s needs); and the conception of a public – a collective (usually national)
body that is capable of having interests and needs. In various ways, these aspects
of a public realm have been challenged in the name of the ‘private’, bringing
about what John Baldock has called the ‘declining publicness of public services’
(2003: 68). I will argue that globalisation and neo-liberalism have been identified
as two of the core forces in the process of dissolving the public. I will also be
arguing that the dominant views of these forces tend to overstate their scope and
effects, while ignoring their uneven and unfinished character.
But first it is important to say a little more about these conceptions of the
public realm. Our understandings of the public realm rest on a dichotomous
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distinction between the public and the private. Much debated, this distinction
tends to cohere around the poles of private-as-individual/familial/domestic,
and public-as-market/state/politics/bureaucracy (see, for example, Landes, 1998;
Ribbens McCarthy and Edwards, 2002; Slater, 1998). It will already be clear that
these clusters are not the same as the distinction between state and market
that has been prominent in social policy. Indeed, the market has a tendency to be
categorised as both private and public in different ways of drawing the distinction
between the public and private. So, in contrast to the private as familial/domestic,
the market is part of the public domain, but, in contrast to the public sector or
public services, the market is understood as private (referring to the private sector,
private interests and so on). There are, then, ambiguities about what counts as
public and private that result largely from the historically and culturally variable
construction of the boundary. As (almost) everyone agrees, this is not a universal,
eternal or natural structuring of the social world. Writing about the emergence
of new forms of the private in post-Socialist China, Judith Farquhar argues
that:
some writers have been tempted to see new forms of subjectivity and intimacy in reform China
as a reappearance of something that was always hidden there, a liberation in which the natural
individual throws off the yoke of an oppressive collectivism. I think this is a mistake. The
simplistic idea of a natural individual with universal needs and capacities cannot explain for
me the considerable labor that reform era writers devoted to the task of producing new forms
of experience, selfhood, memory and discourse. (2002: 176)
The construction (and reconstruction) of a distinction between public and
private involves the division of institutions, activities, dispositions and what
Ribbens McCarthy and Edwards (2002: 201) call ‘ways of being’ into the different
realms. In the process, boundaries are drawn – identities and positions are
allocated – and an apparently clear separation is affirmed. This boundary is
central to the world of social policy – defining what may be safely left to the
‘natural’ instincts of the private world of the family and what needs must be
met publicly. It involves defining the terms of the private realm (especially
through legal regulation); and the conditions under which the public power
may intervene in the private realm (see, for example, Gordon, 1989; Land, 1997).
This dichotomous distinction is also a relationship – the public and private
are ‘mutually constitutive’. Each pole needs the other to define itself against –
and the boundary between them is one that is traversed regularly (this is a
generic feature of borders and boundaries, see Leontidou and Afouxenidis,
1999). Rules and norms govern the practices of boundary crossing – enforcing
standards, ‘liberating’ choices, licensing relationships, surveilling behaviours,
and organising economic and emotional ‘investments’ in the private realm. In
social policy terms, the rise of ‘welfarism’ in western capitalism saw the boundary
redrawn towards an expanded (and more interventionist) public realm. But it is
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this ‘welfarist’ form of public–private distinction that has been most obviously
challenged in the last twenty-five years.
Globalisation has been identified as a major driving force – an inexorable
economic transition responsible for undermining nation states, rendering public
spending indefensible, dismantling welfare states and over-riding democratic
political control. This apocalyptic view has a number of problems, only some of
which I want to touch on here (there is a growing literature debating the subject,
see, inter alia, Deacon, 1997; Gough, 2000; Sykes, Palier and Prior, 2001, and Yeates,
2001 in social policy). First, the apocalyptic or ‘strong’ (Yeates, 2001) view of
globalisation overstates the extent and scale of change in the public realm in many
of the advanced capitalist societies of the West. Those researching welfare systems
have emphasised the (surprising) resilience of public spending and provisioning,
and have suggested the need to contrast globalisation with attention to national
and local political and social institutions (Esping-Andersen, 1997; Huber and
Stephens, 2001; Kuhnle, 2000; Taylor-Gooby, 2001a). Nevertheless, there is a
danger of forcing a binary choice here: either transformative globalisation or the
persistence of the nation-state/welfare state. Obscured by such binary choices are
a range of destabilising processes of apparently settled institutions, formations,
borders and boundaries – including the ways in which nations, states and welfare
are being aligned (these arguments are developed in Clarke, forthcoming, a
and b).
A different view of globalisation would foreground questions of social and
spatial unevenness – rather than treating it as a unified, unilinear and monological
process (see, inter alia, Brah, Hickman and MacanGhaill, 1999; Gupta, 1997,
2000; Ong, 1999). It would avoid the profoundly reductive form of economic
determinism of apocalyptic views of globalisation – celebrating, or bewailing,
the irresistible capacity of global capital to conform the world to its desires.
I think there are political and theoretical reasons to resist such determinism,
not least because it marks the coincidence of neo-liberal fantasies and left-wing
nightmares in overstating the coherence, power and achievements of capital (see
the discussions by Gibson-Graham, 1996; and Morris, 1998). Instead, I want to
insist on treating contradiction and contestation as integral elements of these
processes. I want to argue that there are contradictions within and between
the processes of globalisation, manifested in unevennesses, disturbances and
encounters with old and new resistances and refusals.
It seems to me that such starting points might allow us to think of
globalisation in a more differentiated, more uneven, more contradictory and
more unfinished way than the view from an apocalyptic political economy. It
might also allow us to think of neo-liberal globalisation as one strategy that
aims to conform the world to its grand plan, rather than being the whole (and
only) globalisation (Massey, 1999). The attempt to create the conditions for
US-dominated formations of transnational capital to be mobile, flexible and
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profitable is certainly the dominant tendency of contemporary globalisation, but
it is by no means the only. There are other transnational relations, processes
and realignments – from ‘global care chains’ (Hochschild, 2001), through
regional and inter-regional migrations (Castles and Davidson, 2000) and new
forms of international solidarity and political action (most obviously the anti-
globalisation movement). It is also significant that neo-liberal globalisation looks
more dominant and compelling from the point of view of the Anglophone West
(especially the US/UK axis). From elsewhere, it more obviously resembles one
way of constructing capitalist modernity. For example, Aihwa Ong has argued
that the attempt to construct a ‘Confucian capitalism’ involves China and other
Asian states ‘in the process of constructing alternative modernities based on new
relations with their populations, with capital and with the West’ (1999: 35).
Of course, these are not just different trends that sit side by side. The US
driven neo-liberal globalisation also attempts to install itself as the only, the
necessary and the most desirable way. It attempts to ‘hegemonise’ supra-national
institutions (Deacon, 1997, 2001). It works through such institutions as the WTO,
World Bank and IMF to install its ‘truths’ on dependent nations around the
globe (with particular effects on Eastern Europe, South America and Africa).
It attempts to subordinate, dislocate or de-mobilise ‘alternative modernities’
wherever it encounters them. In the process it deploys various forms of power:
military, economic, political, cultural and – of particular interest for me here –
discursive power. Put crudely, neo-liberalism tells stories about the world, the
future and how they will develop – and tries to make them come true. I do not
mean to deny its undoubted successes. Studying the politics of welfare in the
UK and the USA for the past twenty years is hardly the basis for an optimistic
view. But even here, thinking of neo-liberalism as a strategy allows us to explore
the gaps between ambition and achievement – rather than taking neo-liberals’
word for it. We are perhaps too ready to treat policy texts and political visions
as if they translate immediately and unproblematically into practice. Catherine
Kingfisher argues that neo-liberalism ‘is neither unitary nor immutable, and
it is always in interaction with other cultural formations or discourses’ (2002:
165). To achieve dominance neo-liberalism has to do political work – forming
alliances and blocs, and de-mobilising alternative possibilities. Kingfisher’s study
of welfare reform in different Anglophone states reveals substantial variation, as
well as shared tendencies. In looking at the public realm, I want to suggest that
this approach to neo-liberal globalisation as a mobile strategy enables us to think
about contradictions and contestation. It allows us to explore the changing sites
and forms of refusal, resistance and accommodation: to see why neo-liberalism
still fails to rule the world.
Against the public
The neo-liberal strategy has been consistently hostile to the public realm. Its
distinctive combination of anti-welfarism and anti-statism means that it has
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sought to dismantle welfare states, and the social, political, economic and
organisational settlements that sustained them (Clarke and Newman, 1997). Neo-
liberalism has challenged conceptions of the public interest, striving to replace
them by the rule of private interests, co-ordinated by markets. It has insisted that
the ‘monopoly providers’ of public services be replaced by efficient suppliers,
disciplined by the competitive realities of the market. It has disintegrated
conceptions of the public as a collective identity, attempting to substitute
individualised and economised identities as taxpayers and consumers (Clarke,
1997). These remain core commitments of the neo-liberal strategy, although
in practice they are modulated in different ways through their encounters
with particular national political-cultural formations (Clarke, forthcoming a;
Kingfisher, 2002). Here, I will be focussing on the UK during the last twenty-five
years, but a UK understood as part of shifting geo-political alignments, not least
in its articulation with the USA and Europe (see also Garland, 2002; King, 1999;
King and Wickham-Jones, 1998).
I want to draw out some of the different means of dissolving the public realm
used by neo-liberalism (and in its alliances with neo-conservatism). The starting
point must be the powerful and complex insistence on the primacy of the private.
In neo-liberal discourse, the ‘private’ means a number of inter-locking things,
each of which is naturalised by being grounded in extra-social or pre-social
forms. First, it designates the market as the site of private interests and exchange.
Private interests in this sense are both those of the abstract individual (known
as ‘economic man’ for good reason) and the anthropomorphised corporation,
treated as if it was an individual. This personifying of the corporation extends to
its having needs, wishes, rights and even feelings. Corporations are, in a sense,
doubly personified – both in the persons of their heroic leaders (Chief Executive
Officers) and in the corporate entity itself (Frank, 2000). This personification
enables some distinctive populist rhetorics characteristic of neo-liberalism. Both
types of individual (economic man and the corporation) suffer the burdens
of taxation, the excesses of regulation, the interference with their freedom and
shackling of the ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ by ‘big government’. Government/the
state/public institutions are challenged in the name of what Frank (2000) calls
‘market populism’. But the individualist definition of the private is also a point of
crossover between the market and the familial/domestic meaning of private.
‘Economic man’ is also ‘family man’, motivated by the interests of himself
and his family. The individual of neo-liberalism is profoundly, normatively
and complexly gendered (Kingfisher, 2002: 23–5). Kingfisher argues that the
‘possessive individualist’ form of personhood involves distinctive understandings
of ‘independence’ and ‘self-sufficiency’: ‘Autonomy, the pursuit of rational self-
interest and the market are mutually constitutive in this formulation . . . there
is an equivalence between individualism and self-sufficiency’ (2002: 18). This
conception of the independent individual – detached from social relationships –
is grounded in the distinction between public and private in a different form:
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In this construction, ‘independence’ is displayed in the public realm, while ‘dependence’ is
sequestered to the private sphere . . . the public, civil society generated by means of the social
contract is predicated on the simultaneous generation of a private sphere, into which is jettisoned
all that which is not amenable to contract. (2002: 24)
This distinction between public and private is deeply gendered (Pateman, 1988;
Lister, 1997). It has two implications for neo-liberalism. On the one hand, it is the
site of potential alliances with a range of other political discourses that sustain a
gendered and familialised conception of social order (from Catholic familialism
to Christian Socialism, for example). On the other, it is a focus for tensions and
conflicts around women’s dual role (articulating public and private realms in the
‘dual shift’ of waged and unwaged labour). Welfare reform – in the US, UK and
elsewhere – has been partly about the resolution of these tensions in relation to
lone motherhood (Kingfisher, 2002).
This double sense of the ‘private’ (as the market and the domestic) leads
to what might be called ‘the two privatisations’ in the process of neo-liberal
remakings of the public realm. The first concerns a shift between sectors; the
second, a shift between spheres. Privatisation has involved the shift of activities,
resources and the provision of goods and services from the public sector to the
private sector (variously described as commercial, corporate, for profit). The
voluntary, independent, not-for-profit or ‘third’ sector occupies an ambivalent
place in this privatisation – being not-public, being not-for-profit; and being
expected to behave in a more ‘business-like’ fashion in the contract culture
(see, for example, Deakin, 2001; Lewis, 1995). The shift from public to private
sector has been legitimised in a number of ways. At the core was an assault on
‘bureaucratic’ inertia and inefficiency (Du Gay, 2000) and the celebration of
the market as dynamic, innovative and flexible. But there was also the contrast
between ‘monopoly providers’ and plural provision to enable ‘consumer choice’;
and the juxtaposition of ‘producer’ and ‘consumer’ interests (Clarke, 1997; Clarke
and Newman, 1997).
The dissolution of public sector based service organisations has significant
consequences for the political, economic and social relations of welfare (see
Mackintosh, 1998). In particular, this process dislocated patterns of employment
which had been a major route to waged work for women and minorities
(Huber and Stephens, 2001: 47; Malveaux, 1987). Similarly, conditions of service
(including job security and progression) were typically severely worsened by
the transfer of provision to the private sector (see Standing, 2002, on the
spread of ‘labour insecurity’). At the same time, controls over the quality,
level and conditions of provision typically became attenuated in the process
of privatisation, raising new problems of contracting, regulating and inspecting
‘at arm’s length’ (Clarke and Newman, 1997; Hoggett, 1996; Walsh, 1995). This
is not intended to romanticise either the experience of working for, or being
served by, public service professional-bureaucracies, but to acknowledge the new
problems created by privatisation processes.
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The second form of privatisation has been the shift of social responsibilities
from the public sphere (where they formed part of the business of government) to
theprivate sphere (where they become matters of individual, familial or household
concern). This process has been most visible in relation to providing (and to
some extent funding) care for elderly and disabled people, in the movement to
‘community care’ after the 1990 NHS and Community Care Act. The gendered
structuring of care as obligation is well understood. But this privatising process
has also affected other public services and welfare provision. For example, in
education, schooling increasingly relies on familial support for children and
schools with both finance and unpaid labour (as governors, as unpaid assistants,
as fund-raisers, as ‘active parents’ evoked in home–school contracts). This all
goes alongside the more visible shift to parents as choice exercising ‘consumers’
of their children’s education (Gewirtz, Ball and Bowe, 1995). In health care,
improvements in medical procedures (alongside a commitment to high turnover
in ‘bed management’) have typically transferred recovery and convalescence
from institutional settings to domestic ones. Meanwhile policy aims to produce
‘responsible subjects’ in a range of activities from adopting ‘healthy life styles’,
through ‘self-management’ of chronic conditions, to the more disciplined use of
the telephone in contacting either emergency services or General Practitioners
(Secretary of State for Health, 1997, 1999). Finally, the shift to meaner and more
conditional forms of income support ‘privatises’ the tasks of ‘getting by’: from
personal investment calculations and risks (e.g., in pensions); to new forms of
family economy (multiple wage-earning); and to indebtedness, loan sharking,
and illicit sources of income as means of filling the gap (Williams, 2001).
Such changes have involved significant – and largely invisible – transfers
between the public and private realm, including transferring costs from
public resources to (typically unmeasured) household resources. This form
of privatisation assumes the existence of a stable nuclear family as the
norm of household formation, and the persistence of a gendered division
of domestic/caring labour. The conception of infinitely elastic female labour
continues to underpin such privatisation, even in the face of substantial change
in the patterns of women’s paid employment. Policy makers have clung on to these
beliefs with remarkable consistency despite the impact of social and economic
change, and despite the political struggles that have challenged this complex of
familial, patriarchal and heterosexual norms. Of course, this ‘privatisation’ is not
merely a process of transfer to an unchanged private space. The private is re-
worked in the process – subject to processes of responsibilisation and regulation;
and opened to new forms of surveillance and scrutiny. Both corporate and state
processes aim to ‘liberate’ the private – but expect the liberated subjects to
behave responsibly (as consumers, as parents, as citizen-consumers). Whether
such subjects come when they are called is a different matter.
Both meanings of the private (as sector and as sphere) and both processes
of privatisation have been central to the dissolution of the public realm under
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neo-liberalism in the UK, embodied in the Thatcherite Conservative Party’s
mission to break the ‘shackles of socialism’. Although they have not gone
uncontested (by workers, users, other citizens and some policy experts and
advocates), they have been dominant tendencies. They have undercut both the
meanings and the institutional forms of the public realm. In part, they have
done so by insisting that there is no general public interest (only private choices).
Alternatively, they have insisted that if there is a public interest, it takes the form
of a consumerist desire for efficient and high-quality services, which will be best
served by private provision and private choices. Here, it is possible to see traces
of the partial shift from the period of ‘high Thatcherism’ (‘There are no such
thing as society, only individual men and women and their families’), to what
Colin Hay called ‘Blaijorism’ (1996: ch. 8), the management of the post-Thatcher
political settlement. Here, in the governments of Major and Blair, public services
have made a partial return (though always problematised), as have notions of
society and the ‘social’ (captured in Blair’s distinctive formulation of ‘social-ism’,
meaning a recognition that there is such a thing as society . . . ). In what follows, I
want to examine both the processes of neo-liberal dissolution, the limitations and
unfulfilled ambitions of that project, and the shifting political accommodations
to the persistence of the public.
Beyond politics: Neo-liberalism’s reason
These processes of dissolution also included attempts to de-politicise the public
realm. By this I mean the attempt to deny, defuse or displace the possibility of
political conflict, choice or decision by subjecting public issues to alternative
‘regimes of truth’. This Foucauldian concept points to contested knowledge
formations that lay claim to defining the world, its problems and possibilities and
the directions that need to be taken. Politics – in its liberal democratic sense –
is both a regime of truth (ruling out the irrational, marginal, irresponsible or
utopian Others who are not part of the party political field of ‘real politics’) and a
field in which (some) regimes of truth, some discourses, contend. Paradoxically,
then, politics is the site through which the de-politicisation of the public realm
must be conducted. This paradox is reflected in transatlantic politics of the New
Right – an ‘ideological politics’ that sought to establish regimes of truth ‘beyond
politics’. The New Right systematically set itself against (variously) the post-war
consensus, elite liberalism, social democracy and the like (Clarke, 1991: ch. 6). In
the process, they actively politicised areas that were apparently ‘settled’ as matters
of political consensus or professional neutrality. At the same time, New Right
governments endeavoured to de-politicise critical public issues through installing
economic and managerial discourses as the dominant frameworks for decision
making.
By economic discourse, I mean the framing of public, political and
governmental choices through a universalising logic of cost calculation (Newman,
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1998; see also Prince, 2001, on fiscal and market discourse). This is perhaps
most visible in the framing of welfare policy in terms of ‘what we can afford’
(typically in the construction of an equivalence between national public spending
and the domestic ‘purse’). Good fiscal housekeeping became an obligation that
(supposedly) governed the behaviour of prudent consumers, corporate managers
and national governments alike. In practice, of course, the long boom was
financed by a mix of household, corporate and national debt. The imagery
of financial probity became increasingly separated from corporate practice (as
revealed in financial and auditing ‘irregularities’ of Enron, Worldcom and others
in 2002). Nevertheless, the logic of international competitiveness in a global
economy placed economics in command – over-riding or denying the possibility
of political choices. This economic discourse is partly legitimised by reference to
the universality and superiority of the market as a decision-making mechanism.
Its effects are felt around large-scale decisions (the presumed superiority of
private sector providers) and micro-level decisions (the purchasing of care for a
disabled person). The logic of cost competition (the pursuit of ‘Value for Money’)
aims to drive out or subordinate ‘ambiguous’ issues of values, orientations and
other political choice-making criteria in favour of the rational, transparent and
readily calculable ‘bottom line’. That which cannot be financially represented
(economically valorised) is ruled inappropriate or irrelevant (Power, 1997). There
is a further neo-liberal paradox here. The economic calculus of neo-liberalism
expels that which cannot be counted – but it seeks to bring more and more of
human activity within the economic calculus. Most things – even those previously
decommodified or uncommodified – can be brought to market.
There have been different ‘routes to market’ in terms of service and
organisational design (Clarke, 1999a), including:
• Direct privatisation – the transfer of services, organisations and resources to
the private (for-profit) sector (Whitfield, 2000).
• Public/private partnerships involving finance; capital projects; facility and
service management, and the basis for many ’ pilot projects’, ‘zone’ initiatives
and so on (Glendinning, Powell and Rummery, 2002).
• Outsourcing – the requirement that public bodies purchase service provision
through contracting processes (Walsh, 1995). These have ranged from
Compulsory Competitive Tendering for Local Authorities and the NHS,
through Market Testing in the Civil Service to the ‘Best Value’ regime
introduced by New Labour.
• Creating new markets – public bodies being required to develop markets
for particular services by prompting alternative service providers (for- profit
and not-for-profit). The development of Community Care involved ‘ring
fenced’ resources given to Social Services Departments to buy services from
independent (i.e., non-public sector) providers.
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• Making internal markets (separating purchasers and providers) within an
organisation or a service, visible in different forms in health and social care
(Mohan, 2002).
• Creating new conditions for competitive success (e.g., in school recruitment;
in ‘performance’ evaluation; in bidding for ‘extra’ resources).
These varieties of privatisation and marketisation enact the economic discourse
of neo-liberalism. They are ways of making its claims to truth come true in
practice. In the process, they dislocate apparently settled understandings of
the ‘public’ character of public services – separating and changing structures,
relationships and systems. They disrupt the apparent integration of finance,
provision, and sectoral location in the production of public service. They
contribute to the creation of what we have called a ‘dispersed state’ (Clarke and
Newman, 1997). ‘Dispersal’ multiplies the number of agents and agencies involved
in delivering a particular service. It engages more agencies and agents as the
proxies of state power. It creates new horizontal and vertical relationships between
organisations, such that horizontal relations are primarily competitive (for
‘customers’ or resources, or in performance evaluation). The vertical relations –
between core and periphery – involve selective decentralisation: ‘the freedom
to manage’ (Pollitt, Birchall and Putnam, 1998). This is combined with the
centralisation of direction supported by new means of control at a distance:
new systems of regulation, inspection and audit (Clarke et al., 2000).
Managerialism – as an ideology and a discourse – is clearly linked
with economic discourse (Clarke and Newman, 1997). Indeed, managerialism
embodies this decision-making calculus in its commitment to a rational, ruthless,
business-like view of organisational and policy choices. ‘Managers’ are the bearers
of ‘real-world’ wisdom of how to be ‘business-like’. They embody the generic
‘corporate’ ethos of transformation, innovation, efficiency and flexibility (Cutler
and Waine, 1998). Managerialism has provided a cohering thread across the range
of different organisational forms that have emerged in the remaking of public
services. Voluntary and public, as well as private, sector organisations are now
expected to be ‘business-like’. Managerialism provides the discourse (and set of
practices) that functions as an internal ‘organisational glue’ and the currency
through which inter-organisational relationships are conducted.
Managerialism adds other legitimating resources to the power of economic
discourse. It differentiates managers from other sorts of organisational (and
social) actors, who are flawed by comparison. Other organisational and
occupational groups are prone to making choices on the basis of narrow
professional or sectional interests – managers rise above such narrow interests
to take a wholly corporate view of what is necessary. Where other occupational
groups rely on particularistic knowledge to solve problems, managers bring
to bear an open and transparent rationality. Where the narrow interests of
occupational groups threaten to produce organisational chaos, managers produce
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decisions which are both transcendent and integrative (see the discussion of
hospital ‘bed management’ in Green and Armstrong, 1995). But managerialism
also attempts to subordinate political actors. Where managers are pragmatic,
politicians are dogmatic. Where managers are rational, politicians are partisan.
Where managers are rooted in the ‘real world’, politicians are either rooted
in ideology or rootless, tossed in the winds of public opinion. In these ways,
managerialism not only embodies the economic calculus, it also tries to dissolve
the competing claims of organisational and policy-making power. I want to stress
the ‘tries to’ in the preceding sentence (and in this analysis generally) because
managerialism still has ‘troubles’.
It has trouble with ‘professionals’ – both because of their power bases and
for practical reasons (they often know and do necessary things). Managerialism
has trouble, too, with politicians (local and national) involving uncertainty and
conflict about relationships of domination and servitude, about the boundaries
between policy and implementation, or strategic and operational matters.
Managerialism also has its own problems of public trust – managers are not
yet viewed as heroes or angels (as nurses are) in the public imagination (Clarke,
1996). The troubles of managerialism are paralleled by some of the troubles of
the dispersed state. These transformations of public services have produced some
paradoxical perverse consequences. Some of these have been addressed by New
Labour as a way of marking out the distinctiveness of the Third Way (between
old left and new right, and between state and market: Blair, 1998; Giddens,
1998). ‘Dispersal’ has fragmented service provision, multiplying the number
of agents and agencies involved, increasing the number of (micro) decision-
making settings and generating new problems of co-ordination, regulation and
scrutiny. A second, and related, effect is the creation of boundary disputes between
organisations about the limits and scope of organisational responsibilities
(sometimes expansive, but more often defensive, as a means of turning away
claims on a limited budget). The increased centrality of resource management at
all levels of the organisation has produced a new ‘proprietorialism’ – a sense of
ownership of budgets and resources that makes them the focus of inter- and
intra-organisational tactics (these effects are discussed in Clarke, 1999b).
Dispersed systems also seem to require new control and co-ordination processes
(in the UK this has seen the creation and expansion of new systems of audit and
inspection, Hood et al., 1998; Power, 1997).
Since the mid-1990s, New Labour has attempted to appropriate and address
problems of fragmentation and dis-integration by a new emphasis on partnership,
working together in ‘joined-up government’ (Newman, 2001; Glendinning,
Powell and Rummery, 2002). They have also massively expanded the array
and range of audit and inspection systems (Clarke et al., 2000). Processes
of privatisation and marketisation have been the subject of much rhetorical
argument – in relation to the NHS, transport (the railways and London
Underground), Public–Private Partnerships for capital and other projects. But in
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practice they have continued as core features of how services will be organised
and ‘modernised’, with only occasional reflections on the limits and limitations
of markets (Brown, 2003).
Dispersed systems also seem to be prone to oscillations around the axis
of strategic and operational management (as both government and service
managers seek more power and less responsibility). New Labour has placed both
resource and discursive emphasis on ‘delivery’, addressing the task of overcoming
the organisational, occupational and cultural obstacles to ‘modernisation’
in public services (Newman, 2001). It has combined centralising zeal (over
policy, resources and objectives) with an enthusiasm for local innovation and
managerial autonomy – so long as the local autonomy is exercised in the right
directions. ‘Freedom’ from central control can be ‘earned’ by performance – and
performance measurement and management have been the consistent theme
of New Labour governance (Clarke, 2003). This ‘managerialist’ cast of New
Labour displays some continuities and discontinuities from the Conservative
governments of the 1980s and 1990s. There is a continuity of commitment to
disparaging ‘bureaucracy’, ‘red tape’ and unnecessary ‘regulation’ (including
the creation of a Better Regulation Taskforce), and to the building of better
management capacity to bring about modernisation and the better delivery of
better quality services. But perhaps the most obvious ‘Third Way’ articulation of
managerialism came in the commitment to ‘Evidence Based’ policy and practice
(Davies, Nutley and Smith, 2000; Trinder and Reynolds, 2000). The ‘Third Way’
eschewed dogmatic preference for either the state or the market, valuing instead
a ‘pragmatic’ view that ‘What counts is what works’ (Blair, 1998). This pragmatic
and managerialist rationalism attempts to defuse and depoliticise conflicts both
within the Labour Party and in the wider political field.
I have tried to draw out the de-politicising ambitions of economic and
managerial discourses in the remaking of the public realm in the UK. The
economic calculus is installed as the dominant decision-making calculus at
supra-national, national, local and organisational levels. It provides the framing
assumptions which other discourses have to contest or negotiate. But the view
that choices in public policy cannot be reduced to economic calculation has
been remarkably persistent. Public attitudes have shown a surprising degree
of continuity throughout this period of neo-liberal dominance, tending to see
‘more resources’ rather than ‘better management’ as the key to improving public
services (particularly in health and education); and viewing responsibility for
service provision (and service failures) as located with government, rather than
‘local management’. There is a remarkable persistence (given the intensity of
the neo-liberal onslaught over the last three decades) in the belief that serving
the public is the ‘government’s business’. Public support for publicly provided
welfare persists at a high level (Commission on Taxation and Citizenship, 2000:
36–8, 44–56; Taylor-Gooby, 2002).
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Who counts? Representing the public
There has been a sustained effort to dislocate the dominant conceptions of
the public as a collective identity with (more or less) common interests and
rights in relation to the state. One of the accomplishments of New Right politics
was to split the citizen identity into three differentiated figures: the tax-payer,
the scrounger and the consumer (Clarke, 1997). In the process, taxes (and
their payers) were placed in a potentially antagonistic relationship with the
user/abuser of services (the scrounger). Separating out the ‘taxpayers’ in this
way makes it possible to attribute to them a distinctive interest. As Davina
Cooper has shown in her analysis of the concept of ‘Fiduciary Duty’ in local
government, ‘taxpayers’ interests are equated with efficient, cost-effective services
and business-like practices’ (1998: 83). She suggests that this equivalence rules out
other social and political orientations to public service. It also conceals a double
discursive construction. In the process, an economic calculus for the evaluation
of public services was further naturalised, and the ‘disconnection’ between taxes
and services was deepened (Commission for Taxation and Citizenship, 2000: 55).
The figure of the consumer embodies a different view of the public. Although
there are extensive arguments about the consumer model and its use in public
services, it is clear that the idea of the consumer has added new dimensions to
the way the public interest is being represented. Above all, ‘the consumer’ is held
to mark a shift from ‘passive recipient’ to ‘active choice maker’ in relation to
services. This active consumer is the force that requires modern public services to
be adaptive, responsive, flexible and diverse rather than paternalist, monolithic
and operating on a model of ‘one size fits all’. The consumer thus forges a story
about the past and future of public services (Clarke, 1998). Like the taxpayer,
s/he is an economic invention. Consumers know their own wants, can make
rational choices and expect producers to serve them. Like taxpayers, consumers
are abstracted from other social roles and positions, including the problematic
and stressful conditions in which many public services may be used (Barnes and
Prior, 1995). Consumerism registers diversity (everyone has different wants) but
does not recognise the inequalities of social differentiation. Finally, consumerism
constructs the public interest as a series of specific and individualised encounters
and interactions: each consumer consumes a particular bit of service. Collective
consumption of public services is invisible (as is the ‘enforced consumption’ of
services).
Evaluative agencies engaged in the inspection and audit of services have been
constructed as representatives (if not ‘champions’) of the public as consumers.
They construe themselves as representatives of users/consumers in a potentially
adversarial relationship to ‘producer interests’. Despite the nominal diversity of
consumerism, consumers are often practically invoked in normative ways (such
that the ‘normal family’ remains the template against which others may have
‘special needs’). This model of rational choice implies that we would all make the
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same calculations about price/quality trade-offs (and are unlikely to let ‘dogma’,
‘ideology’ or other forms of unreason cloud our choices). The collection of
evaluative and comparative information is understood as making organisations
more ‘transparent’ to consumers and making information available that will
enable the exercise of rational choice on the part of consumers (Clarke et al.,
2000). Where the public as taxpayer legitimates the pursuit of efficiency (and
economy), the public as consumer legitimates the pursuit of comparability and
permanent improvement in standards of service. The taxpayer and consumer
have been the dominant representations of the public and its interests in the last
decade, but there are signs of an emergent third view of the public.
Where the taxpayer and consumer conceptions of the public imagine
a privatised identity for the public, other pressures have shaped a more
differentiated conception of the public at the end of the twentieth century. In
part, this reflects the refusal of conceptions of the public and the social to
disappear under the neo-liberal challenge. In a variety of ways attachments
to collective identities and solidarities persist – even when they are internally
conflict ridden. So, conceptions of the public as a nation jostle with anti-
racist and multi-cultural challenges to the tendency to equate nation-people-
race. Traditionalist or nostalgic images of the social contend with alternative
views of modernity. Although this is not the place to explore these issues in
detail, I want to stress the importance of such conceptions of the social and
public – they are not merely ‘residual’: the traces of old ways of thinking
(Clarke, 2000). They are active political and cultural discourses – around which
people mobilise, organise and act. But in the dominant discourse – that of
New Labour – the public is now imagined as a field of differences: different
‘communities’, different cultures, and different socio-demographic groups who
may have different interests (Rose, 1999). There are a number of strands that
play into such conceptions of a diverse public. One emerges from the range
of activist social movements and their intersection with the local state around
‘equalities’ struggles (Breitenbach et al., 2002; Newman and Williams, 1995). A
linked strand is formed by the pursuit of ‘access’, ‘anti-discriminatory’ or ‘anti-
oppressive’ practices in different professional fields (Lewis, 2000). Increasingly
sophisticated marketing and sampling processes attentive to both demographic
and ‘lifestyle’ differentiation have also played a part. New Labour’s response
to the impoverished conception of the public realm of neo-liberalism stresses
consulting or even being in partnership with ‘communities’ of place and identity
(Hughes and Mooney, 1998). All of these have, as Newman (2000, 2001) argues,
made an issue out of the politics of representation and the ‘representativeness’ of
public services.
Such a view of the public raises some profound, and profoundly contested,
problems. How is such diversity to be understood? Can the public interest
be produced from sampling the population by age, ethnicity, gender, sexual
orientation or other socio-demographic categorisations? How is a diverse public
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to be consulted and represented? Are there differences in how services are to
be evaluated? If so, how can they be either accommodated or reconciled (if not
by the imposition of majoritarian norms)? New Labour has operated with an
uneasy combination of choice and consultation that tends to be dominated by
managerialist orientations (Rowe and Shepherd, 2002). Choice – the prerogative
of the ‘demanding, sceptical citizen-consumer’ (Secretary of State for Social
Security, 1998: 16) – is deployed in the modernisation-through-marketisation
approach that dominates New Labour’s approach to services (Andrews, 2003).
But this sits alongside growing demands for consultation and participation
(at the local level) with the public and communities, including, especially,
the ‘business community’ (DETR, 1998). Adding such collective dimensions to
the taxpayer/consumer models of the public implies political, processual and
technical problems for the articulation of a public interest (see also, Ellison, 1999;
Fraser, 1997).
New Labour, neo-liberalism and ‘modernising’ the public realm
I have tried to indicate some of the ways in which New Labour’s relationship
to the public realm has continuities and discontinuities with the period of
Thatcherism. How to assess the political tendency or direction of New Labour
remains one of the more controversial issues in academic (and journalistic)
analysis. This is rather different from the evaluation of New Labour’s policy
impact (Powell, 2002a; Toynbee and Walker, 2001). Rather, this question goes
back to the relationship between neo-liberalism as a transnational strategy and
specific national political formations and projects. National political formations,
party ideologies and governmental programmes are rarely ‘pure’ expressions of
larger logics. They are compound formations, articulations of different discourses
in temporary unities that (possibly) create party and electoral blocs. Thatcherism
itself was never a purely neo-liberal project. It combined neo-liberal elements
with aspects of conservatism, both old and new – nowhere more evidently than in
the regressive ‘little Englanderism’ that overshadowed the UK’s relationship to the
European Union (and revived images of imperial self-importance). Nevertheless,
neo-liberalism dominated Conservative approaches to the economy, to the
relationship between economy and society, and to the subordination of the public
to the private (in both ‘privatisations’). The power and capacity of the state
(in its dispersed form) was largely directed to supporting and enforcing these
tendencies. But this neo-liberal dominated project was hardly a complete success –
either in its own terms, or in its ambition to establish a new hegemony.
This incomplete project created the ground that New Labour has occupied –
and left some of the political contradictions that New Labour has tried to manage.
A central issue in this political terrain is the persistence of popular attachments to
conceptions of the public and the social. These attachments have been regenerated
around a number of focal points: for example, the failures of privatisations
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(especially the railways), a concern for public transport, a refusal to see the
National Health Service privatised (resulting in a variety of smaller corrosive
reforms), and concern about market failures and public health (especially in food
supply). There have also been expansive movements for human and social rights
from diverse constituencies. All of these take place in a political culture riven by
tensions about the nation, national identity, cosmopolitanism, internationalism
and multiculturalism. New Labour’s rhetorical commitments to ‘social-ism’, to
modernisation, to public services and to a more European sensibility spoke to
some of those unresolved – and undissolved – sensibilities.
How has New Labour occupied this ground? Is it neo-liberalism by another
name? Is it a social democratic government, modernising public services,
addressing problems of social exclusion, social injustice and elitism? Is it
dominated by communitarian impulses that focus attention on social integration
rather than social equality? Is it formally ‘business friendly’ while ‘doing good by
stealth’ – or is it in the pockets of financial capital? Is it European – or American?
A case can be – and has been – made for all of these views (see, inter alia, Burden,
Cooper and Petrie, 2000; Clarke, Gewirtz and McLaughlin, 2000; Glennerster,
1999; Hay, 1999, 2002; Powell, 2002b). But the difficult problem is not that of
noticing that different tendencies are at play in New Labour – it is grasping how
they are ‘structured in dominance’. In relation to the public realm, I want to argue
that New Labour is, indeed, another neo-liberal dominated alliance, but that the
subordinate elements are different from those of the transatlantic New Right of
the 1980s and 1990s, with consequences for how the public realm is inscribed in
political and policy discourse.
New Labour’s ‘modernisation’ requires the continued shift towards both
versions of the private (sector and sphere) that are central to the neo-liberal
strategy. Far from being ‘pragmatic’ about the public–private distinction, New
Labour valorises the private: the private sector as the site of dynamic innovation;
the private sphere as the site of responsible subjects. The function of the public
realm – understood as the combination of government and services to the public –
is to sustain and enable the private sector and responsible/responsibilised
subjects. This includes creating the conditions for participating (as waged
workers, primarily) in a dynamic, flexible, global economy. But it also includes
participating as consumers, as responsible parents and as active citizens – all
of which are seen as necessary conditions for a ‘modern society’ (that is not
just a modern economy). Overcoming the blockages and inhibitions to being
modern (that are effectively ‘pre-modern’ in New Labour terms) may need public
investment, public effort and public services – but they are needed to liberate
active subjects (individuals and corporations) from the past for the future.
This subservient and enabling conception of the public realm is what aligns
New Labour with US centred neo-liberal globalisation – and what disjunctures it
from the ‘European social model’ (Ginsburg, 2001; Leibfried, 2000; Taylor-Gooby,
2001b). But its stronger conception of the public realm (as something more than
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just corporate welfare) separates New Labour from US neo-liberalism (Kingfisher,
2002; Whitfield, 2000). But that more ‘public’ orientation is itself contradictory
and ambiguous. It is not just a matter of juxtaposing ‘neo-liberal’ economy
with a more ‘social’ public and social policy; or of contrasting neo-liberalism
and social democracy (new or old). The significance of subordinate elements
in a political formation is that their subordination inflects or reshapes their
meaning and function. So, New Labour’s conceptions of the social and the public
derive from a number of sources – communitarianism, European discourses
of social exclusion/inclusion, English-centred discourses of nation and people
(against the ‘excesses’ of asylum and migration), ‘old’ Labour puritanism and
moralism (sometimes known as ‘Christian socialism’), and ‘equality’ struggles
of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. But they are articulated to a neo-liberal conception
of an economised society (and world) through the nodal point of ‘Work’ (Clarke
and Newman, forthcoming; Lister, 2002).
But the presence of subordinated elements in political formations also has
political, policy and practical consequences. New Labour is not just neo-liberal.
These other elements reflect the problem of translating neo-liberalism into
practice – especially in Western capitalist democracies. Enforcing neo-liberalism
in other settings may be easier (whether through IMF structural adjustment
policies or military force). But establishing neo-liberalism as the dominant
trajectory in European settings has proved more problematic. Conceptions
of the public and the social, and their embedding in collective institutions,
relationships and identities, have proved surprisingly resistant to the threats and
promises of neo-liberalism. New Labour’s modernisation speaks to those residual,
persistent and emergent solidarities, and attempts to find ways of ‘socialising’
neo-liberalism (Hall, 1995). And it does so in the context of trying to unify
a dominant political bloc and a sustainable electoral majority. Managing the
contradictions of neo-liberal modernisation – domestically and internationally –
looks like hard work.
New Labour needs to inhabit the terrain of the public and the social, even
as it re-articulates them towards neo-liberal meanings and practices. It needs
to do so for reasons of party (keeping organisation, resources, membership and
the ‘labour movement’ more or less in place); for reasons of electoral success
(sustaining the socially diverse base of New Labour support); and for reasons
of national–international statecraft (positioning a ‘modern Britain’ in relation
to neo-liberal globalisation). In this respect, New Labour attempts to settle
conflicting conceptions of modernity – presenting one (more or less coherent)
view of a modern society (Andrews, 1999; Clarke and Newman, forthcoming).
In doing so, it has to address the social/public ‘excess’ that lies beyond the
neo-liberal imagination – that which cannot be contained by the ‘private’. It
enacts neo-liberalism in a political–cultural hybridised formation – as do other
national–regional political projects (Kingfisher, 2002: 52–3). It does so through
mixing a complex set of (more or less contradictory) conceptions of a modern
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economy and society. This ‘hybridity’ is visible in the regular use of paradoxical
terms to define New Labour’s programme: ‘liberal collectivism’ (Ginsburg,
2001); ‘market collectivism’ and ‘post-social communitarianism’ (Fitzpatrick,
1998); neo-liberal humanism’ (Andrews, 1999); ‘passive revolution’ (Johnson and
Steinberg, forthcoming) and ‘regressive modernisation’ (Hall, 1988, 1996). These
paradoxical designations deal with both principles (of ideology, philosophy,
orientation) and processes (forms and directions of transformation). Neo-
liberalism is enacted in different hybridised formations – in different national
politics, in different regional contexts (Europe; North America, Africa, Asia and
others); and in supra-national institutions and processes (WTO, IMF, etc.).
New Labour’s modernisation programme may have strong transatlantic links,
but its enactment of neo-liberalism is not the same as US Republicanism (or
even Clinton era New Democrats), not least because of the different weight of
conservative and neo-conservative discourses in the US. But nor is it ‘European’ –
differing from the stronger public/social orientations of both Social and Christian
Democracy which still attempt to accommodate and subordinate neo-liberal
demands within national and regional strategies (Clarke, forthcoming a; Huber
and Stephens, 2001). New Labour’s neo-liberal hybrid reflects something of its
geo-political location and tendency – in the EU but not ‘European’, and with a
‘global’ orientation mobilised though economic, military and policy affinities as
part of a transatlantic neo-liberalism.
I have tried to offer a view of partial, unfinished and contested dissolution of
the public realm in the UK. While wanting to give analytic attention to the forces
of neo-liberal globalisation, I have wanted to tell a story that examines some
of the limits and limitations of this strategy, rather than celebrate or bemoan
the ‘global roll out’ of neo-liberalism. I think it might be important to pose the
question of why it is so hard to eliminate, dissolve or dismantle the public realm
(in its different meanings and incarnations). I do not mean to underestimate
the weight and range of the neo-liberal project, nor of the forces allied with it.
Nor do I mean to romanticise the persistence of the public realm – it remains
selective, unequal, differentiating, constraining and oppressive in many ways. But
it is also the site of political–cultural investment, attachments, identifications as
well as old and new solidarities. Its persistence speaks to two issues that matter
(to me, at least). The first is that dominant strategies are just that – strategies.
They require intense political-cultural work to make them come true – and we
should be wary of reading outcomes from strategies. The second issue concerns
questions of tensions, contradictions and contestation. Dominant strategies do
not occupy an empty landscape. They have to overcome resistances, refusals,
and blockages. For many reasons, the public realm (and the attachments that it
mobilises) is part of the ‘grit’ that prevents the imagined neo-liberal world system
functioning smoothly. It makes a difference to our view of the world if we start by
looking for the grit – taking notice of the recalcitrance, resistance, obstruction,
and incomplete rule – rather than throwing them in as a gestural last paragraph
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after the ‘big story’ has been told. Starting with them in mind might create a little
more thinking and breathing space by lifting the dead weight of the Big Stories
from our minds. The contested fortunes of the public realm are testimony to the
limitations of neo-liberalism’s plan to rule the world.
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